ANTITRUST-NONPROFIT

HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
PRICING POLICIES AND THE SCOPE OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

AcT-De Modena v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1230 (1985).
PRICE DISCRIMINATION

In recent years, the health services industry has witnessed
the growth and increasing public acceptance of the health maintenance organization (HMO).' For a monthly premium, 2 the
HMO provides its subscribers and their dependent family members with all necessary health care, ranging "from a [tetanus]
shot to brain surgery, at little or no additional charge."'3 Unlike
traditional health insurance policies, however, the HMO provides
the subscriber with direct health services, instead of reimbursements for medical services rendered.4 The HMO thus incurs the
largely open-ended contractual risk of satisfying all of the subscriber's health care needs.5
As both an insurer and provider of health care services, the
HMO integrates two critical elements of health care into a solitary administrative structure, 6 thus further distinguishing it from
the traditional "fee-for-service" system of medical care.' Its twofold nature controls rising health care costs by making health
I The HMO concept is not of recent origin. See Note, The Role of PrepaidGroup
Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887, 890 (1971). First
organized in a small rural health clinic during the 1920's, id., by 1983, over 270
different HMOs served over 11.6 million people throughout the United States. See
Kleinfeld, The King of the H.M.O. Mountain, N. Y. Times,Jul. 31, 1983, § 3, at 1, col.

2.
2 This fixed monthly fee is actuarially established, much like any insurance premium. See Havighurst, Health MaintenanceOrganizationsand the Marketfor Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716, 718 (1970).
3 Friedland, Health Systems Said to Clash on Cost of Care, N. Y. Times, Nov. 13,

1983, § 11, at 1, col. 1.
4 Id.
5 See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 718 & n. 9.
6 Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role of Antitrust Law, 1978
DUKE L.J. 487, 488.

7 In the traditional fee-for-service method of medical services payment,
each service is valued by the provider and billed separately. Insurance
. . .covers specified incidents of care, and a third party then replaces
the utilizer of medical services as payor. While some kinds of insurance
place limits on the amounts providers can charge, the prevailing financing system involves individual agreement between the provider of services and the recipient as to the services to be received and the price to
be paid.
Note, supra note 1, at 891-92.
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care services more efficient.8 In view of these benefits, the Federal Government 9 and a number of state legislatures '0 have enacted statutes specifically designed to facilitate the development
of HMOs.
Due primarily to the long and vigorous opposition of organized medicine, it was only recently that the Government began to
promote HMOs." In fact, for nearly forty years, organized
8 See generally Havighurst, supra note 2, at 720-22 (advantages of HMOs). Havighurst identifies several other institutional features that enable HMOs to implement efficient management practices in order to control health care costs. Id. The
fundamental principle encouraging cost control is that the HMO assumes the entire
economic risk of a patient's health services because the fee the HMO charges is
fixed. See id. at 718. For example, the healthier the patient, the less need for future
expensive medical procedures to combat catastrophic illnesses. HMOs thus have a
strong economic incentive to implement preventive care systems, an incentive lacking in the traditional fee-for-service system. Id. at 721. Because the HMO is responsible for all of the patient's medical expenses, it does not have the traditional
tendency to provide unnecessary medical services. Id. at 720. Equally important,
the HMO system encourages physicians and hospitals "to consider cost effectiveness and to avoid overusing expensive [medical] facilities." Id. It also allows the
physician to spend more time caring for patients and less time dealing with incidental administrative activities such as billing. Id. at 721. This administrative structure, coupled with larger market strength, enables the HMO to analyze, select, and
bargain for the most economical supplies, including pharmaceuticals. See id. An
HMO also brings together physicians and health care specialists. Id. at 720-21.
Because payment to the physician for services rendered is more certain in the HMO
system, and because the HMO physician tends to consult with specialists more, the
HMO physician has a greater incentive to refer patients to other doctors with more
appropriate skills for curing their maladies, thus encouraging the early detection
and cure of catastrophic illnesses and thereby reducing overall medical costs. See id.
at 721-22.
9 The Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act was proposed by President Nixon on February 18, 1971 as a comprehensive plan to provide the American
people with "an alternative means of procuring health care." Id. at 716. The plan
was approved by Congress and signed by the President on December 29, 1973.
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914
(1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17). In the Act, Congress provided for over $300 million for the planning and development of HMOs
and helped to remove some of the institutional impediments to development, including preempting state laws that were considered obstructive. Stern, Health Care
Expansion: Provisions of the Health M'Iaintenance Organization Act of 1973, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 89, 89 (1974). The legislation has not furnished the universal health
care for the poor as promised by its promoters. See Schneider & Stern, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 90, 105
(1975); Rose-Ackerman, Social Services and the Aarket, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1405,
1426-28 (1983).
10 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2J-1 to -30 (West Cum. Supp. 1985-1986)(New
Jersey's Health Maintenance Act, which was enacted two days before the Federal
law became effective); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 437.03 (West Cum. Supp.
1986)(HMO defined for state health planning purposes); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 641.17-.39 (West Cum. Supp. 1985).
SI1See Kissam, supra note 6, at 492-93. Initially, organized medicine condemned
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medicine, through political influence and control of the Government's regulation of the health care industry, effectively prevented the expansion of HMOs.' 2 Despite this formidable
relied
opposition, the proponents of HMOs have successfully
13
upon the Federal antitrust laws for protection.
Recently, in De Modena v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 4 the
Ninth Circuit considered whether HMOs violate the Federal antitrust laws. Specifically, it examined the drug purchasing activities
of nonprofit HMOs in light of the strict anti-price discrimination
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act.' 5
The court held that the purchasing activities of nonprofit HMOs
were exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the
Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938.16
As of 1983, the defendant in De Modena, the KaiserPermanente Medical Care Program (Kaiser Program), was the
largest HMO in the United States. 1 7 It consisted of three eleHMOs as a form of "unethical medical practice." Id. at 492. In its view, the HMO
system violated the long-standing public policy against the corporate practice of
medicine by interposing impersonal clinical relationships between patients and
doctors. See id. at 492-93.
12 See id. at 495-99. Organized medicine historically utilized state legislatures as
a tool to prevent HMO development. Id. at 495. Some of the tactics employed
included requiring medical licensing boards to negate professional certification of
physicians affiliated with HMOs on the ground that HMO practice was "unethical"
and employing state insurance laws to prevent HMO development. See id. at 49599.
13 See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1942). In
American Medical, the Supreme Court held that the American Medical Association
(AMA) was not exempt from the provisions of § 3 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits the restraint of trade or commerce. Id. at 528-29. The Court stated, therefore, that the AMA could be held liable and criminally responsible for participation
in an illegal, anticompetitive scheme against a prepaid group practice, a forerunner
of today's HMO. See id. at 532. The Supreme Court found this anticompetitive
behavior to include the exclusion of HMOs and their physicians from medical societies and hospital medical staffs, the refusal of fee-for-service physicians to consult
with or accept referrals from HMO physicians, and the spreading of false information about HMOs designed to discourage patients from using their services. Id.; see
also Kissam, supra note 6, at 493-95 (discussing trade restraint practices employed
by fee-for-service physicians).
14 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1230 (1985).
15 Id. at 1390. The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act is discussed nJia
at notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
16 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1396. For a general discussion of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, see infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
17 Kleinfeld, supra note 1, at 1. In 1983, the Kaiser Program had over 4.3 million
members in 10 states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 1, 23. This accounted for
over 36 % of the nation's entire HMO membership. Id. Its revenues in 1982 totaled $2.44 billion. Id. at 23. Its market penetration was such that in northern
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ments.'" The regional Kaiser Health Plans, which were organized as nonprofit institutions, formed the first component of the
Kaiser Program.' 9 Their function was to enroll consumers who
wished to become members of the HMO. 20 The second part was
composed of eight corporate, regional Permanente Medical
Groups, consisting of doctors who contracted with the Kaiser
Program to render medical care to subscribing members. 2 ' The
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, a nonprofit corporation of California, constituted the final segment of the Kaiser Program.2 2 This
entity operated the various hospitals that provided HMO members with extensive health care services. 23
In addition to prepaid medical care, the Kaiser Health Plans
offered their members an elective drug plan.2 " For an extra fee,
25
participants could obtain pharmaceuticals at little or no charge.
The drug plan participant, however, could only obtain drugs
from either a Kaiser hospital pharmacy or a nonhospital pharmacy operated by a Kaiser Health Plan.2 6
Several retail pharmacies located in Oregon and California,
as well as their trade association, filed suit against the Kaiser Program.2" They claimed that the Kaiser Program knowingly induced
or received
discriminatorily
low prices
from
pharmaceutical suppliers in violation of section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act. 28
California, one of four people was enrolled in the Kaiser Program. Id. Membership
is expected to grow at a rate of 5 % per year. See id. at 1.
18 De Modea, 743 F.2d at 1390.

'9 Id. at 1391.
20 Id. at 1390.
21 See id. at 1390, 1391.
22 Id. at 1390. The Kaiser Foundation Hospitals also controlled one of the

Permanente Medical Groups. Id.
23 See id.
24 Id.

25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. The Portland Retail Druggists Association, the trade association, filed a

separate action against the Kaiser Health Plans that was joined to the complaints
brought by the individual pharmacies. See Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1981).
28 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1390. The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act

provided in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price

which is prohibited by this section." 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)(1976).
The pharmacies also alleged that the Kaiser Program, by offering the drug

plan, "attempt[ed] to monopolize the retail drug market in violation of ... the
Sherman Act," and that it created an unlawful tying arrangement of drug sales to
other health services in violation of the Clayton Act. De Mlodeiia, 743 F.2d at 1390.
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The district court granted the Kaiser Program's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the defendant was a charitable, nonprofit institution. 29 The court determined that the Nonprofit Institutions Act exempted the purchasing activities of
nonprofit institutions from the strict anti-price discrimination
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 30 The Ninth Circuit
agreed and affirmed the district court's decision. 31 The circuit
court held that nearly all of the Kaiser Program's activities associated with the drug plan were within the express exemption to the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act.3 2
29 See De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1390.
30 Id. In addition, the district court

found that the pharmacies failed to show
sufficient causal connections to sustain the burden of pursuasion both on the attempted monopolization claim and the tying claim. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n
v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1981); see supra note 28.
31 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1396. The De Modena decision marked the second time
the Ninth Circuit considered the district court's decision to grant the Kaiser Program's motion for summary judgment on the pharmacies' Robinson-Patman Act
claim. Id. at 1390 n. 2. In its first decision, the appellate court concluded that the
district court had prematurely granted the Kaiser Program's motion for summary
judgment. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d
641,646 (9th Cir. 1981). The court reasoned that the district court did not provide
sufficient time to the pharmacies within which to challenge the Kaiser Program's
affirmative defense that its purchasing activities were exempt from the RobinsonPatman Act. Id. In addition, the court remanded the case to the district court to
consider the alternative defense that by offering its drug plan, the Kaiser Program
was engaged in the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarranFerguson Act. Id. at 647. The court concluded that this defense had to be reexamined in light of the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision in Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). PortlandRetail Druggists, 662 F.2d at 646-47.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act states:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business,
unless such Act specifially relates to the business of insurance: Provided,
That after June 30, 1948, the Act ofJuly 2, 1890, as amended, known as
the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known
as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulatedby State
Law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982) (emphasis added). In Group Life, the Supreme Court found
that a drug plan offered by a health insurance company, similar in form and operation to that offered by the Kaiser Program, was not within the "business of insurance" exception of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and that therefore the insurer was
not exempt from the Federal antitrust laws. Group Life, 440 U.S. at 232-33.
32 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1396. The court reversed the district court's finding
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The underlying principle of the American economic system
is faith in free enterprise with minimal governmental interference. 3 Even the most ardent free market advocates realize, however, that the market can be abused by the concentration of
economic power.34 Nevertheless, the concentration of economic
power by itself is not an economic evil. 3 5 Free market micro-economic theory36 has long supposed that by employing the economies of scale, 37 larger economic entities may actually reduce unit
costs and thereby benefit consumers with lower competitive
prices.3 8 Over the long run for the overall economy, however,
that drug sales to nonparticipating customers were de minimis, however, and remanded the issue to the district court. Id.
33 See Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)
(Justice Burton stating that "[t]he heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition"). See generally McAllister, Price Control by Law
in the United States: A Survey, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 285 (1937)("[T]he basic
faith in . . . anti-trust legislation was a faith in the automatism of free
competition.").
34 Adam Smith, the eighteenth century economist who had an unquestioned
faith in the ability of the market to take care of society's needs if it was left alone
free of governmental interference, see R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
66 (4th ed. 1972), and the staunchest opponent of government regulation of the
economic market place, conceded that monopolies and conspiracies designed to
control markets were economic evils, which necessitated an exception to his laissez
faire attitude to government intervention in the markets. See A. SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 232 (1776, reprint 1982); see also R. HEILBRONER, supra, at 6768.
35 This is because larger economic entities may be more efficient than smaller
ones, thereby reducing long run costs. See R. LEFrWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
36 See id. at 11.

417 (7th ed. 1979).

Microeconomic theory is concerned with the economic activities of such
individual economic units as consumers, resource owners, and business
firms. It is concerned with the flow of goods and services from business
firms to consumers, the composition of the flow, and the evaluation of
pricing of the component parts of the flow.
Id.
37 "Economies of scale" refers to the economic phenomenon that the larger the
plant, the lower the unit costs become. See Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n
v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 158 n. 17 (1983). This occurs because of
inherent improvements in the efficiencies of operation on a larger scale and increased productivity that allow a producer to reduce costs. See id. These reduced
costs, in turn, can be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Id. As
Justice Powell stated, "[v]olume purchasing permits any large, relatively efficient,
retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and, to that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale." Id. (emphasis added).
38 See R. LEFTWICH, supra note 35, at 471 (economies of size defined as "the
forces causing a firm's long run average costs to decrease as the output level and
size of the plant are increased. These are usually thought to be (1) increasing possibilities of division and specialization of labor and (2) increasing possibilities of
using more efficient technology").
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the growth of larger economic entities can cause a competitive
"shake-out," which reduces the number of competing firms in an
industry.3 9 This occurs when larger, established producers gain
control of the market and thus acquire the ability to manipulate
prices.4 0
The price manipulator not only gains from monopolistic
profits, but acquires the power to undercut his competitors'
prices. 4 Competitors are forced either to meet the manipulator's price, or to go out of business, thereby reducing competipower.4 2
Price
strengthening
monopolistic
tion
and
manipulation thus is the economic evil that Congress sought to
regulate by enacting the Federal antitrust laws, the purpose of
which was "to buttress the traditional system of free competition,
free markets and free enterprise."4 3
39 See generally R. LEFTWICH, supra note 35, at 316-17 (discussing long run industry "shake-outs" as a result of competitive forces). "Shake-outs" can best be explained by imperfections in the free market system. See id. at 316. Artificial barriers
to the entry of new firms can allow the dominant producers to control the pricing
system. Id. "[L]imit pricing policies of established firms may be used to bar the
door [to entry into an industry]. Established firms may deliberately produce outputs [of products] greater than those that maximize profits, lowering price sufficiently so that it is not profitable for a potential newcomer to enter." Id. at 317
(footnote omitted).
40 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 32-43 (1911)(classic
description of monopolistic activities of large economic entities). By offering preferential rates and rebates, Standard Oil was able to drive out many of its competitors from the petroleum business or to coerce them into joining with it in a
conspiracy to control the market for petroleum products. Id. at 32-33. The Court
found that Standard Oil had controlled over 90% of the petroleum business and
was able to fix the price of all petroleum products and otherwise restrain trade. Id.
at 33.
Some of the adverse consequences of monopolistic activity identified by economic theoreticians include: (1) generally higher consumer prices; (2) the misallocation of societal resources; (3) reduced output; (4) the loss of overall societal
resources; and (5) the inefficient operation of plants. See E. MANSFIELD,
MICROECONoMIcs: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 238-41 (3d ed. 1979); R. LEFTWICH,
supra note 35, at 277-79.
41 See supra note 40.

42 See id.
43 See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940). In United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the Court stated:

Antitrust laws

. . .

are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as

important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle
it can muster.

Id. at 610.
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The first Federal antitrust laws enacted did not expressly
regulate anticompetitive pricing practices.4" Nevertheless, price
manipulation and local price cutting were soon recognized as the
customary symptoms of anticompetitive behavior, necessitating
Federal regulation.45 Consequently, Congress enacted section 2
of the Clayton Act in 1914, which made price discrimination in
commerce unlawful if it lessened competition or created a
monopoly. 6
Although this section 4 7 was expected to have a strong deterrent effect on price discrimination, the inclusion of a proviso that
permitted quantity discounts without regard to actual cost savings 48 negated the Act's desired effect. 4 9 Small businesses were

unable to exact quantity discounts from suppliers and thus were
prevented from competing with large national firms. These
larger firms possessed the economic might to bargain for lower
prices from their suppliers and then pass on the lower prices to
their customers.50 As a result, many small businesses closed,
thereby reducing the number of competitors in the industry and
44 See Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)(codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
45 See McAllister, supra note 33, at 285. One commentator stated that subsequent legislation was enacted by Congress after the Sherman Act because of the
following reasons:
It was believed that certain practices were so generally the tools of incipient monopoly that the proscription of those practices would halt the
fruition of monopoly and restraint of trade. It was believed that government would act more effectively if it could step in and check certain
practices than if it must wait until its only recourse was to seek to dissolve the trust at the height of its power. It is in this connection that the
prohibition against the discriminatory price first made its appearance in
federal anti-trust law in Section 2 of the Clayton Act. It was designed to
check the elimination of a competitor by local price cutting.
Id.
46 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730-31 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1982)).
47 See id. Section 2 of the Act stated "[t]hat nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price . . . on account of differences in the grade, quality, or
quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in
the cost of selling or transportation." Id. (emphasis added).
48 See id.; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948).
The Supreme Court stated that the "section has been construed as permitting
quantity discounts . . . without regard to the amount of the seller's actual savings
in cost attributable to quantity sales or quantity deliveries." Id. (citation omitted).
49 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948)(quantity discount provision of Clayton Act rendered Act inadequate); see also Rosoff &
Dunfee, A "'Fix"for the Retail Pharmacy: The Supreme Court Redefines Application of the
Robinson-Patman Act to Drug Sales by Nonprofit Hospitals, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 195, 243
(1977)(quantity discounts negatively affect competition).
5o See Rosoff & Dunfee, supra note 49, at 243.
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ultimately harming free markets.5 1
With the occurrence of the Great Depression and the continuing decline in economic activity in the 1930's, public sentiment
prompted Congress to strengthen the ineffective protections of
section 2 of the Clayton Act. 52 Congress was expressly concerned with limiting the Clayton Act's quantity discount defense
to actual cost differences. 53 Thus, in 1936, Congress passed the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act. 54 This Act amended
and strengthened the Clayton Act provisions.5 5 Unlike the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited all price discrimination,5 6 except when justified by cost savings. 5 7 Moreover, if the
complainant demonstrated price discrimination, the RobinsonPatman Act shifted the burden to the defendant, who then had to
justify the price discrimination within the constraints of the Act.5 8
Finally, the Robinson-Patman Act imposed liability upon buyers
who knowingly engaged in illegal price discrimination. 5 9 Violators of the Act were subjected to criminal penalties, 60 as well as
51 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44
(1960) (description of Congressional concern at time of enactment of RobinsonPatman Price Discrimination Act); see also Bacco, Depression Tale: Putting the Chain
Stores in a Cage, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1985, at 30, col. 3 (public protests by small
businessmen in the 1930's sought passage of Federal and state laws to protect them
against competition from large chain stores).
52 See Bacco, supra note 51, at 30.
53 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1948)(discussing Congressional purpose "to limit 'the use of quantity price differentials to
* . . actual cost differences' " to protect against competitive oppression) (citations
omitted).
54 Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b,
21a (1982)).
55 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 535, 544
(1960).
56 See Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, ch. 592, § 2(c)-(f), 49 Stat.
1526, 1527 (1936)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)-(f)(1982)). The RobinsonPatman Act defined price discrimination as including not only actual price differentials, but also ancillary favors-such as paying commissions in connection with the
sale of goods, paying for facilities or services at prices different than those charged
to other purchasers in connection with the sale of goods, or rendering services in
connection with the sale of goods on terms different from all other purchasers. See
id.
57 See id. § 2(a)-(b), 49 Stat. at 1526 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)(b)(1982)). Cost savings refer both to quantity and transportation discounts. See
id.; see also Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 250
(195 l)(description of reasons for quantity discount defense).
58 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, ch. 592, § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526,
1526 (1936)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13(b)(1982)).
59 Id. § 2(f), 49 Stat. at 1527 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 13(0(1982)); see supra
note 28 (setting forth text of § 13(f)).
60 Id. § 3, 49 Stat. at 1528 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1982)). This sec-
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the traditional treble damages afforded by civil antitrust
remedies. 61
Shortly after its enactment, the deficiencies of the RobinsonPatman Price Discrimination Act became evident. In particular,
nonprofit institutions were adversely affected by the stringent
anti-price discrimination provisions of the Act. 62 Historically,
nonprofit institutions, such as hospitals, educational facilities,
and other chartiable agencies, were routinely granted price
breaks unavailable to other customers. 63 The Robinson-Patman
Act, however, appeared to prohibit such price concessions to
nonprofit institutions.64 Congress responded to this dilemma by
enacting the Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938.65 This Act exempted supply purchases by nonprofit institutions from the
Robinson-Patman Act.66 It permitted the exemption only to the
extent that the purchased supplies were for the nonprofit institutions' own use. 6 7
tion states: "Any person violating any of the provisions of this section, shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both." Id.
61 See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1982). This section states: "[A]ny person who shall be injured . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained." Id.
62 See generally Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S.
1, 12 (1976) ( "[T]he legislative history of the Nonprofit Institutions Act indicates
clearly that that Act was concerned with the suspicion that Robinson-Patman, at the
time just recently enacted, actually might operate to outlaw price favors that sellers
would wish to grant to eleemosynary institutions.")(citations omitted).
63 See H.R. REP. No. 2161, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938) (letter by John H.
Hayes, President of the Hospital Bureau of Standards and Supplies, dated Dec. 18,
1937).
64 See id. at 1.
65 Ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1982)).
66 Id. This Act stated: "Nothing in . . . the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act. . . shall apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools,
colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." Id.
67 Id. An organization may qualify as a nonprofit institution under the Act, but
its sales may not qualify for the exemption. See 3 E. KINTNER &J. BAUER, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW § 25.9 (1983). In Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co.,
232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956), the court dismissed a
claim by a self-sustaining university bookstore for the exemption. Id. at 50 & n.5,
51. Although some of the purchases by the bookstore were found to be for the
university's own use, the court found that the bookstore was actually reselling the
books at a profit. Id. at 50 n.5. The court concluded that such resale activities did
not fall within the provisions of the exemption. Id.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit upheld the exemption as it applied to the sale of
bowling lanes to a state university athletic facility. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 378 F.2d 212, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). The court
concluded that the term "supplies" expressed in the Act's exemption meant "any-
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Few recorded cases have construed the exemption provided
by the Nonprofit Institutions Act.6 8 In the context of health care
services, only one case, Abbott Laboratories v. PortlandRetail Druggists Association,6 9 has addressed the scope of the Act's exemption.
In Abbott Laboratories, the pricing policies of several retail pharmaceutical companies were challenged by an association of retail
pharmacies. 0 The pharmacies alleged that local hospitals were
purchasing drugs at prices that were lower than those being offered to the pharmacies in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 71 In construing the exemption to this Act contained in the
Nonprofit Institutions Act, the Supreme Court concluded that it
was limited to certain sales made by pharmaceutical companies to
nonprofit hospital pharmacies.7 2 The Court expanded a sales
categorization scheme earlier formulated by the appellate
court. 73 The Abbott Laboratories Court classified ten categories of
sales into two groups 74 -those eligible for the exemption and
thing required to meet the institution's needs." Id. at 216. This included both
consumable items and permanent material installations. Id. Although the bowling
facility was available and open to the public for a fee, id. at 214, the court concluded
that the supply purchases were nevertheless exempted from the Robinson-Patman
Act because its "primary purpose ... was to fulfill the needs of the University in
providing bowling facilities for its students, faculty and staff." Id. at 217. For a discussion of the Logan Lanes and Students Book decisions, see generally Note, The Proper
Scope of the Non-Profit Institutions Exemption: Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail
Druggists Association, 31 Sw. L.J. 606, 609 (1977).
68 Rosoff & Dunfee, supra note 49, at 200.
69 425 U.S. 1 (1976).
70 See id. at 1. The plaintiff pharmacy association in Abbott Laboratories, the Portland Retail Druggists Association, was a party to the De Modena case. See De Modena,
743 F.2d at 1388.
71 Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 5.
72 See id. at 14.
73 Id. at 8; see Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d
486, 489 (9th Cir. 1974) (appellate court's enumeration of sales categorization
scheme), vacated, 425 U.S. 1 (1976).
74 Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 9. The 10 categories included the following:
1. To the inpatient for use in his treatment at the hospital. For present
purposes, we define an inpatient as one admitted to the hospital for at
least overnight bed occupancy.
2. To the patient admitted to the hospital's emergency facility for use
in the patient's treatment there. A patient in this category may or may
not become an inpatient, as defined in the preceding paragraph.
3. To the outpatient for personal use on the hospital premises. For
present purposes, we define an outpatient as one (other than an inpatient or a patient admitted to the emergency facility) who receives treatment or consultation on the premises.
4. To the inpatient, or to the emergency facility patient, upon his discharge and for his personal use away from the premises.
5. To the outpatient for personal use away from the premises.
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those ineligible.75 In the Court's view, a hospital drug purchase
qualified for the exemption if it was for the hospital's own use. 76
This ten-part categorization scheme, according to the Court,
was the "definitive construction of [the] language in the Nonprofit Institutions Act." ' 77 The Act, the Court stated, did not provide an exemption for every activity undertaken by a nonprofit
institution.78 Instead, the Court held that an activity qualified for
the exemption only if it was within the basic institutional purpose
of the nonprofit agency. 79 The Court stated that certain activities, such as dispensing drugs to inpatients, emergency room patients, and even outpatients while on hospital premises, may
properly be considered "traditional" hospital activities within the
scope of the exemption provided by the Act. 80 The Court found
that hospital pharmaceutical sales to walk-in customers were not
protected by the Act, however.8
6. To the former patient, by way of a renewal of a prescription given
when he was an inpatient, an emergency facility patient, or an
outpatient.
7. To the hospital's employee or student for personal use or for the
use of his dependent.
8. To the physician who is a member of the hospital's staff, but who is
not its employee, for personal use or for the use of his dependent.
9. To the physician, who is a member of the hospital's staff, for dispensation in the course of the physician's private practice away from the
hospital.
10. To the walk-in customer who is not a patient of the hospital.
Id. at 9-10 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court qualified its categorization
scheme by noting that it was not meant to be "exhaustive." Id. at 10 n.8.
75 Id. at 14-19.
76 Id. at 14.
77 See id. at 6.
78 Id. at 14. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized the legal
"line-drawing" undertaken by the Court. Id. at 10. He noted, however, that the
test as to whether a particular purchase qualified for the exemption was an "obvious one," id. at 14, determined solely upon whether the hospital could properly be
considered the consumer of the drug. See id. at 10-12.
The Court noted that the role of the nonprofit hospital had broadened dramatically since the passage of the Nonprofit Institutions Act-from an institution serving the sick and the poor to a modem community health center. Id. at 13. The
expansion of the nonprofit hospital, the Court opined, did not, however, justify an
automatic extension of the exemption to every new responsibility assumed by a
nonprofit hospital. Id. The Court held that purchases that "promote[d] the hospital's intended institutional operation" qualified for the Act's exemption. Id. at 14.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 10-11.
81 Id. at 18. The Court observed, however, that certain infrequent emergency
sales to walk-in customers when other pharmacies are closed may prove to be de
minimis and too infrequent to cause noticeable injury. Id.; see also ilfra notes 114116 and accompanying text (discussing De Modena s reasoning of same issue).
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In applying this newly articulated "basic institutional purpose" test, the Abbott Laboratories Court concluded that sales to patients who received treatment on hospital premises were also
within the scope of the exemption. 8 2 The Court opined that if
the patient were merely returning to the hospital to refill a prescription, however, the exemption would be inapplicable.8 3 Similarly, the Court applied the exemption to drug sales to hospital
employees, students, or physicians for their own use or for their
dependents' use, but not for resale by the hospital staff in their
medical practice. 8 4 The Court reasoned that sales to hospital employees were exempt because they constituted fringe benefits
necessary to satisfy collective bargaining provisions, which in
turn served the institutional purpose of the hospital.8 5
For the Ninth Circuit in De Modena, the Supreme Court's Abbott Laboratoriesdecision was the only relevant precedent.8 6 Judge
Norris, writing for a unanimous court, first considered the three
elements comprising the Nonprofit Institutions Act's exemption.8 7 To be eligible for the exemption, the court stated that the
Kaiser Program had to show that it was a nonprofit institution,
that it was an eligible institution under the Act, and that the
drugs were purchased for its "own use. "88
The court approached the first statutory element by recognizing that both the Kaiser Health Plans and the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals were organized as nonprofit institutions.8 9 Judge
Norris rejected the pharmacies' contention that because the Kaiser Health Plans and the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals were controlled by the for-profit Permanente Medical Groups, they had
Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
84 Id. at 16-17.
85 See id. at 16 & n.9. The Court argued that the fringe benefits were necessary to
retain employees for long-time assignments in order to maintain high quality health
care. Id. For a comparison of the positions taken by the trial court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories,
see Rosoff & Dunfee, supra note 49, at 209-17. The trial court adopted a de
minimis test approach-if resales were insignificant so as not to cause injury, the
plaintiff could not recover. Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 7. The Ninth Circuit
adopted an approach that focused upon where the sale was made-a simple geographic proximity test. Id. at 7-8. The Supreme Court rejected both views and held
in favor of an elaborate examination of the institutional nature of the sales by the
hospital. Id. at 8-10; see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1392.
87 Id. at 1391.
82

83

88 Id.
81) Id.
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lost their nonprofit status. 90 Rather, he agreed with the findings
of the Internal Revenue Service and the district court that, because the for-profit Permanente Medical Groups did not exert
control over the Kaiser Health Plans or the Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, these entities had retained their nonprofit status. 9 '
Although the Kaiser Health Plans and the Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals contracted with the Permanente Medical Groups' doctors for the delivery of certain medical services, the court observed that the doctors did not set their own fees.9 2 Judge Norris
noted that the Permanente Medical Groups instead were paid an
agreed amount by the Kaiser Health Plans for each member, regardless of the particular services provided by the doctors to
each member.9 3
The court next addressed the eligibility of both the Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals and the Kaiser Health Plans under the
Nonprofit Institutions Act. 9 4 Because hospitals are expressly eligible under this Act, the court held that the Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals were exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act.9 5 The
court also held that the Kaiser Health Plans were exempt from
the Robinson-Patman Act. 96 The court reasoned that although
they were not expressly included within the language of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, they nevertheless fell within the Congres97
sionally intended scope of that Act's exemption provisions.
The court recognized that the drafters of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, in explicitly exempting "charitable institutions, ' 98
sought "to protect the same eleemosynary institutions that are
given special consideration under the tax and charitable trust
laws." 9 9 Lending support to its conclusion, the court noted that
since the passage of the Act in 1936, the nature and responsibilities of charitable institutions have expanded dramatically, to the
extent that today all nonprofit organizations delivering health
services are considered charitable.' 0 0 The court was also per90 Id.
91 Id.
93

Id.
Id.

94

Id.

92

95 Id.

96 Id. at 1392.
97

Id. at 1391-92.

98 See supra note 66

(setting forth applicability of the Act to charitable
institutions).
99 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1391 (citations omitted).
100 Id. at 1391-92 (citations omitted).
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suaded by the rulings of other courts that had deemed the Kaiser
Health Plans charitable institutions for tax purposes.' 0 '
Judge Norris lastly addressed whether the pharmaceutical
purchases made by the Kaiser Health Plans and the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals were "for their own use" within the meaning of
the Nonprofit Institutions Act.' 0 2 The court acknowledged that
the categorical rules test established by the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories was its only relevant precedent.' 0 3 In
discussing that decision, however, the court concluded that it
could not literally apply the categorical rules test to the circumstances presented by the Kaiser Health Plans' practices. 10 4 The
court thus stated that Abbott Laboratoriesstood for the proposition
that the overriding determinative factor for defining "own use"
of the nonprofit entity
was the "basic institutional function"
05
claiming the Act's exemption.1

In applying this test, the circuit court stated that an HMO
has an extraordinarily "broad institutional function" designed
"to provide a complete panoply of health care to [its] members." ' 0 6 The court reasoned that, unlike fee-for-service hospitals, which provide temporary and usually remedial health care to
their patients, the HMOs provide "continuing and often preventive health care for their members."' 0 7 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that drugs purchased by the Kaiser Health Plans for
resale to its members were within its "basic institutional function," and as such they were purchased "for their own use"
within the meaning of the Nonprofit Institutions Act.'0 8
The De Modena court believed that its holding fell firmly
within "the primary Congressional purpose of the exemption to
the Robinson-Patman Act, which is to aid nonprofit institutions
101 Id. at 1392; see, e.g., Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 17781 (1978)(HMO is nonprofit institution for tax purposes).
102 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1392.
I03 Id.; see supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text (discussing Abbott Laboratories
decision).
104 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1393; see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text
(discussing categorical rules test).
105 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1393.
106 Id.
107 Id. The court clearly distinguished between the purchases by a hospital and
those by an HMO. See id. The distinguishing feature, the court stated, is that "the
relationship between the HMO and its members is ongoing, not temporary," while
the relationship between a hospital and its patient terminates when the patient is
discharged from the hospital. Id. at 1393 n.7 (citation omitted); see also supra notes
1-9 and accompanying text (general description of HMO services).
108 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1394.
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by lowering their operating expenses."' 0 9 The court also maintained that its decision was in accordance "with national health
care policy."" 0 The court observed that in 1976 Congress
passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act"'. in order to
provide consumers with a free choice among the various methods

of health care delivery, thus lowering the costs of medical care." 2
Moreover, the refusal to extend the exemption to HMOs, the
court stated, would undermine Congressional intent by providing hospitals with a market advantage over HMOs.II 3
Although the De Modena court ruled that all sales to the Kaiser Health Plans' members through the drug plan were exempt
from the Robinson-Patman Act, the court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine whether the Kaiser Health Plans'
sales to nonmembers were also exempt because they were so minor as to be de minimis.' "' The Ninth Circuit opined that the de
minimis issue could not be decided solely upon the relative percentages of such sales to the total sales of the Kaiser Health
Plans.1 5 Instead, the circuit court directed the trial court to reconsider the overall impact of such sales on the competing pharmacies and not merely upon the Kaiser Health Plans' total
sales. 6
The Ninth Circuit was confronted with several complicating
factors in arriving at its decision in De Modena. Because of the
admitted lack of precedent, 117 the court had to reason by analogy to divergent areas of the law.I " Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit had been overturned recently by the Supreme Court in the
hospital pharmacy case of Abbott Laboratories,'" ' and thus seemed
109 Id. (quotingAbbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 23 (Marshall, J., concurring)). The
De Modena court acknowledged, however, that the legislative history of the Act was
"less than crystal clear." Id.
110 Id.
I'' See supra note 9 (discussing the Federal Health Maintenance Organization
Act).
112 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1394.
''3
Id.
114 Id. at 1394-95.
115 Id. at 1394.
116 Id. at 1394-95. The Ninth Circuit briefly considered the pharmacies' appeals
of the attempted monopolization and tying claims, and it subsequently affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Kaiser Program. Id.
at 1395-96; see supra notes 28 & 30.
117 De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1391.
118 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
''9
See Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (9th
Cir. 1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 1 (1976); see also supra notes 70-85 and accompanying
text (discussing Abbott Laboratories decision).
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constrained not to stray far from the structured "basic institutional function" test laid down by the Supreme Court in that
case. 120
The Abbott Laboratories "definitive construction" of the Nonprofit Institutions Act' 2 ' was criticized by commentators for imposing excessive administrative costs upon the nonprofit
institutions that the Act was specifically adopted to benefit. 1 22 In
fact, one commentator has predicted that some nonprofit hospitals might forego the Act's exemption rather than submit to the
onerous procedures necessary to withstand the scrutiny of the
test laid down by the Abbott Laboratories Court. 123 This author
contends that regardless of which alternative a nonprofit hospital
chooses to take-either implement the expensive accounting and
drug segregation procedures necessary to comply with the Abbott
Laboratories decision, or forego the Act's exemption entirely-its
patients would nevertheless face a significant increase in their
12 4
health care costs.
The De Modena court recognized the shortcomings of the Abbott Laboratories strict categorical scheme, but was compelled to
follow it. 1 2 5 The effects of the De Modena decision upon the
purchasing activities of HMOs, however, are very different from
the impact upon hospital pharmacies as a result of Abbott Laboratories. In fact, the result reached in De Modena resembles more
closely the less restrictive district court ruling in Abbott Laboratories' 26 than the Supreme Court's decision that "categorically" re120 For an analysis of the ideological differences between the Ninth Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court, see Stewart, Ninth Circuit'sJudges Frequently Run
Afoul of the Supreme Court, Wall St.J., Dec. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
121 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Rosoff& Dunfee, supra note 49.
123 See generally id. at 217-30 (discussing problems of complying with Abbott Laboratories decision).
124 See id. at 219. The Abbott Laboratories Court anticipated and rebutted the challenges of its critics. See Abbott Laboratories,425 U.S. at 19-21. The hospitals in Abbott
Laboratories argued that the application of the Court's categorization of purchases
would either cause drug suppliers to end the nonprofit discounts offered to hospitals, or require each hospital to institute complicated and expensive drug segregation and accounting schemes to assure that the drugs purchased under the
exemption were distributed only to exempt categories of customers. Id. at 19-20.
The Court concluded, however, that this was "the price the Congress has exacted
for the benefits bestowed by the [Nonprofit Institutions Act]." Id. at 20.
125 See De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1392-94. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in De Modena
is a virtually verbatim recapitulation of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Nonprofit Institutions Act found in Abbott Laboratories. Compare id. at 1391-92 with Abbott
Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 11-14.
126 See Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486, 488
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1 27
jected the less rigorous analysis.
In De Modena, as in the district court's decision in Abbott Laboratories, all sales by the HMO to its members through its drug
28
plan-and those to nonmembers found to be de minimis1 _
qualified for the express exemption contained in the Nonprofit
Institutions Act. 12 9 Conversely, in the Supreme Court's Abbott
Laboratories decision, only certain sales that fit within very structured categories were eligible for the exemption. 30 The drugs
distributed and the health services offered by the Kaiser Program
in De Modena, however, are no different from the drugs and
health services rendered by the hospitals in the Abbott Laboratories
decision.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's decision in De Modena has afforded the Kaiser Program, as well as other HMOs, a
cost advantage unavailable to competing nonprofit hospitals
under the Abbott Laboratoriesdecision. De Modena essentially eliminates the need to create a strict drug accounting program to
comply with the Court-imposed drug sale categorization
3 2
scheme.

(9th Cir. 1974) (discussion of unpublished district court ruling of summary judgment for the pharmaceutical companies), vacated, 425 U.S. 1 (1976).
127 See Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 7-11; supra note 85.
128 See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (discussing de minimis sales
issue).
129 See De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1393.
130 See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (explaining services offered by
HMOs).
132 See Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 19-20 (establishing record keeping requirement to segregate nonexempt sales from exempt sales). The cost impact upon hospitals of the Abbott Laboratories scheme has not yet been calculated. It has been
suggested that the decision will result in both an increase in health care costs to the
public and perhaps "an increased profit margin for the large corporations which
make and sell drugs." See Rosoff & Dunfee, supra note 49, at 228-29.
HMOs are not the exclusive purveyors of drug plans based upon periodic subscriber fees. Indeed, in its initial remand to the district court, the Ninth Circuit
specifically directed that the parties consider the Supreme Court's holding in
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), wherein the
Court denied an antitrust exemption for a health insurance company's drug plan
that operated like the Kaiser Program's plan. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1981). The McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982), provides an exemption for insurance company actitivies regulated by the states from all Federal antitrust laws. See Group Life,
440 U.S. at 210-11. Although Group Life did not involve the Robinson-Patman Act,
but rather § 1 of the Sherman Act, the insurers claimed that their drug plan was
eligible for the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption. See id. at 207. The Group Life
Court, however, concluded that the exemption was inapplicable to contractual arrangements that extend beyond the insurance company-policyholder relationship.
See id. at 217. According to the Court, the "business of insurance" exemption contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act was unavailable to health insurers unrecog-
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When Congress passed the Nonprofit Institutions Act in
1938, it provided virtually no legislative history revealing its motives. 3 The Act's very existence, however, is wholly dependent
upon the continued enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act.I3 4 Therefore, some insight regarding the exemption contained in the Nonprofit Institutions Act may be
gleaned from the wealth of legislative materials concerning the
Robinson-Patman Act.' 3 5 Perhaps the most enlightening analysis
of the Congressional intent underlying the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act was undertaken by the Supreme Court in
1983 in Jefferson County PharmaceuticalAssociation v. Abbott Laboratories. 3 6 In Jefferson County, the Court held that sales by several
large pharmaceutical companies to state hospitals in Alabama
were not exempt from the provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 1 37 The Court rejected the pharmaceutical companies' argument that purchases by the state hospital pharmacies were exempt entirely from the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the
nized as engaged in the "business of insurance." See id. at 225-27 & n. 33; see also
supra note 31 (discussing McCarran-Ferguson Act). Presumably, the De Modena
court expected this issue to be considered on remand. The Ninth Circuit, however,
did not address the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption as it applied to the Kaiser
Program. See De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1390-96.
Just as similarities exist between HMOs and hospitals, HMOs are also admittedly quasi-insurers offering services similar to and in competition with those of
traditional health insurers. Compare De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1396 (HMO sales exempt from antitrust provisions of Robinson-Patman Act) with Group Life, 440 U.S. at
232-33 (insurer sales not exempt from antitrust laws). Despite these similarities,
the Ninth Circuit opinion in De Modena offers HMOs an express statutory exemption from the antitrust laws that almost certainly will provide them with a significant
cost advantage unavailable to competing health insurers. See De Modena, 743 F.2d at
1391-92 (holding HMOs to be nonprofit institutions for purposes of Nonprofit Institutions Act).
133 See De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1394; Rosoff& Dunfee, supra note 49, at 203 n. 35.
134 See Nonprofit Institutions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1982).
135 It is well-recognized that legislative construction is a part of the judicial process. It is not based on fixed rules of law, "but merely [on] axioms of experience"
in order to determine Congressional intent in enacting legislation. United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952). Reliance upon the legislative history of prior legislative acts that affect the operation of subsequent acts is
one method accepted by the courts to interpret the legislative intent of later laws.
See Piper v. Willcuts, 64 F.2d 813, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1933)(using legislative history
from 1921 tax law to support interpretation of 1932 Tax Code).
Although the views of draftsmen are not generally considered appropriate
grounds upon which to base the interpretation of a statute, an exception is available
where it is clear that the draftsman's views were communicated to the legislature
and there is reason to believe that the legislators were influenced by his views. See
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969).
136 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
137 Id. at 153.
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tenth amendment's prohibition against Federal regulation of the
sovereign activities of the states.' 3 8 The Court stated that only
the purchases for state "consumption in traditional governmental functions" were intended by Congress to be exempt from the
Act.' 3 9 It noted that the one express exemption to the Act applied only to nonprofit institutions. 4 ' Thus, the Court reasoned
that Congress intended the Robinson-Patman Act to apply to a
4
state that chose to compete in the private retail market.' '
In several extensive footnotes, Justice Powell quoted at
length from the legislative history of the Act as presented by H.B.
Teegarden, the chief draftsman of the original bill.142 According
to Justice Powell, "Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental
purchasing would not compete with private purchasing." "4s The
inference that Congress never intended a governmental exemption to the Robinson-Patman Act to apply where the benefactor
of the exemption is in competition with private purchasers thus
becomes quite clear. Unfortunately, no similar legislative history
exists either to buttress or refute a similar inference in interpreting the Nonprofit Institutions Act.' 4 4 The striking similarities of
the market positions between governmental activities and nonprofit activities, however, lends credence to the view that Congress, by analogy, did not intend the Nonprofit Institutions Act
to apply where the benefactor of the exemption elected to compete in activities traditionally left to private enterprise.
A comparison of any of the decisions rendered by the courts
in cases involving the Robinson-Patman Act and the Nonprofit
Institutions Act demonstrates the contradictory and confusing
results that can be reached, even in cases that are as similar as De
Modena and Abbott Laboratories.'45 The courts, faced with almost
indistinguishable fact situations, have rendered different deci138

Id. at 154 n.6.

139 Id. at 154.
140

Id. at 154-55.

141 Id. at 154.

See id. at 160-64 nn.19-23.
Id. at 162 n.21. Justice Powell subsequently stated, however, that the assumption was inapplicable to the Jefferson County case. Id. In response to questioning
from Representative Hancock, Mr. Teegarden stated:
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the
bill, [the Robinson-Patman Act]. If they are not in competition with
each other, then they are in a different sphere.
Id. at 160 n.19 (citation omitted).
144 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145 Compare Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S. at 19-21 (some, but not all, hospital sales
142
143

240

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:220

sions, a situation that calls
once again for legislative reform of the
46
Robinson-Patman Act. 1

The analysis of the Nonprofit Institutions Act furnished by
the De Modena court is consistent with the fundamental purposes
of this Act. On the other hand, it offers little solace to those
small proprietors who have relied upon the protections of the
Robinson-Patman Act.' 4 7 Even though the court exercised care
in its interpretation of the exemption to the Act, the vastly
changed circumstances in which the Act operates today, as compared with the conditions in existence when it was first enacted,
have surely broadened the scope of the Act beyond what Congress may have ever intended. Thus, it is not only judicial interpretations of the Act that have adversely affected small
proprietors, but also the operations of an antiquated antitrust exemption ill-suited to present day realities.
For small proprietors, such as the retail pharmacies in De
Modena, the Ninth Circuit's recognition of an exemption for an
institution as large and financially well endowed as the Kaiser
Program 1 48 will most certainly have devastating effects on the

former's ability to compete absent the protections of the Robinson-Patman Act. While exercising their market power unrestricted by the Robinson-Patman Act, the Kaiser Program and
other large nonprofit HMOs will be able to offer services at much
lower prices. 1 49 The size of nonprofit institutions when the exemption was first enacted was small in comparison to the nonprofit agencies in existence today. 150 Whether Congress
exempt) with De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1396 (all HMO sales exempt) and Jefferson
County, 460 U.S. at 171 (government sales not exempt).
146 See Rosoff & Dunfee, supra note 49, at 242-49. The Robinson-Patman Act was
passed during a different era than the other antitrust laws. During the Great Depression, smaller proprietors, who already faced hard economic times due to the
generally failing economy, sought and received from Congress protection from
larger enterprises that could use their market strength to exact lower prices from
their suppliers. Id. at 243. This relief came in the form of the Robinson-Patman
Act, which has sometimes been called the "Anti-Chain Store" Act. Id. The Act has
been termed by one Justice of the Supreme Court as "a singularly opaque and
elusive statute." Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530
(1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). In a nation that promotes the ideal of a free market
economy, it seems contradictory to have a law such as the Robinson-Patman Act,
which controls the pricing decisions of suppliers. See generally Comment, Eine Kleine
JuristischeSchlummergeschichte, 79 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1966)(Robinson-Patman Act is
illogical and does not fit with United States free market economy).
147 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 17.
149 See supra note 37.
150 In a letter to Congress from John H. Hayes, President of the Hospital Bureau
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envisioned nonprofit institutions of such magnitude that they
would rival some of America's largest corporate giants in market
power,' 5 ' and whether an exemption from antitrust laws should
be available to these institutions, will forever remain uncertain.
In any event, the sheer market power of the Kaiser Program and
other nonprofit institutions similarly situated should serve as a
signal to Congress that the principles underlying the RobinsonPatman Act are being frustrated to the detriment of the proprietary activities of the small businesses that the Act was designed to
protect. Moreover, this insidious erosion of the Act's legislative
prohibitions is occuring through the invocation of the very exemption to the Robinson-Patman Act that Congress itself created. The solution to this dilemma, however, is not within the
province of the courts, but with Congress. Congress should reexamine the Act's depression era prohibitions in order to update
them to the realities of the 1980's.
Steven N.J. Wlodychak
of Standards and Supplies, which advocated passage of the Nonprofit Institutions
Act, the author noted that in 1937, 2700 nonprofit hospitals throughout the United
States spent over $150 million on food and supplies for the needy sick. H.R. REP.
No. 2161, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). In 1983, the Kaiser Program had gross
revenues of $2.44 billion. See supra note 17. The Kaiser Program alone thus had a
greater market strength than all the nonprofit hospitals operating in the United
States combined when the bill was passed. It is unclear that the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption for the Kaiser Program is the occasional price favor that Congress contemplated would not interfere with "the wholesome purpose of the
Robinson-Patman Act." See H.R. REP. No. 2161, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
151 In fact, if the Kaiser Program were a profit making enterprise, its available
1983 gross revenue figures of $2.44 billion would rank it number 152 on the 1985
Fortune 500 list of the largest American corporations, above such recognized corporate giants as Uniroyal, Wang Laboratories and Mack Trucks. See generally The
Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 270, 270-72 (listing largest revenue
corporations).

